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Writing As Reading in the Textual Tradition
By Jeremy Cohen
“Very well, my dear fellow,” Socrates says to his
interlocutor Phaedrus, “but you must first show me what it is
that you have in your left hand under your cloak, for I surmise
that it is the actual discourse” (477). Very little could
invalidate an argument more rapidly, in Plato’s terms, than
reading it from paper. Centuries later, by the time Macrobius
was personifying and fetishizing the worthy passage, an entire
textual tradition of Greek and Latin had moved to the
forefront of Hellenic and Roman culture. The ability to read –
for authorial intent and concealed meaning alike – became
vital. Plotinus optimistically yearned for beautiful emanations
of universal truth throughout the world. Informed by
Christian theology and acosmistic love, Augustine aspired to
the salvation of souls. Compared to these lofty aims, the
endeavors of Horace and Longinus – noble pagans both,
direct heirs to the classical heritage – seem trivial. Effectively
writing clever, self-fulfilling guides to composing good
poetry and sublime oratory, their concern is in perfecting a
craft (pragmatic ars and techne, respectively), yet the authors
are far more playful and passionate than Aristotle in his
detached treatises. For a poet and a rhetorician not obviously
concerned with close readings, they find tremendous vitality
in engagement with the literary tradition.
Fundamentally, Horace and Longinus both set good
reading as a logical prerequisite to good composition. Much
of the craft, they equally maintain, cannot be taught – shown
in Longinus’ notion of “great thoughts” (138) and Horace’s
humorous evasiveness regarding specific prescriptions.
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Throughout their works, they default to literary legends with
frequent allusion to Homer and the Greek dramatists;
Longinus even devotes a significant portion to quoting and
interpreting poetry: “Sappho’s excellence, as I have said, lies
in her adoption and combination of the most striking
details” (140). At the same time, Horace contends against
inspiration from the Muse, emphasizing individual strivings:
“Wisdom is the starting-point and source of correct writing.
Socratic books will be able to point out to you your material,
and once the material is provided the words will follow
willingly enough” (129). The oxymoron “Socratic books”8 is
microcosmic to Horace’s unique brand of tongue-in-cheek
seriousness: the good poet really ought to read all the old
masters, even Plato’s repudiations of poetry itself. Indeed
with sardonic solemnity, he beseeches, “Study Greek models
day and night” (128). Glimmers of a cultural inferiority
complex – a common Roman sentiment – seep into his
Greek-Roman comparisons:
Your ancestors praised Plautus’ metre and his
humour. On both counts their admiration was
too indulgent, not to say childish, if it’s true that
you and I know how to distinguish a witless jest
from a subtle one and if we’ve skill in our
fingers and ears to know what sounds are
permitted. (128)
Hidden beneath the jibe is his truth: the necessary skill of the
good reader. Longinus is more overtly inspired in his
readings: “These great figures, presented to us as objects of
emulation and, as it were, shining before our gaze, will
somehow elevate our minds to the greatness of which we
8

Latin: Socraticae chartae, literally “Socratic paper” and equally absurd.
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form a mental image” (143).
Longinus’ statement is significant particularly for his
use of emulation, a term he delineates earlier: “Plato, if we
will read him with attention, illustrates yet another road to
sublimity, besides those we have discussed. This is the way of
imitation (mimesis) and emulation (zelos) of great writers of
the past” (142). Imitation is the copy spurned by Plato and
embraced by Aristotle. Emulation is an entirely different
animal: zelos for Longinus and aemulatio for Horace; a
zealous rewriting of vital cultural works; a literary
appropriation with love. The conventional mimetic tradition
involves the artful representation of real-life events 9
accessible to a layperson audience. The emulator, far more
esoterically, writes for other readers. Under this framework, it
quickly becomes clear which Horace prefers: “My advice to
the skilled imitator (imitatorem) will be to keep his eye on the
model of life and manners, and draw his speech living from
there” (129). (How limiting!) With a clever reworking of the
Odyssey’s opening lines as his device, Horace entreats: “The
common stock will become your private property if you don’t
linger on the broad and vulgar round, or anxiously render
word for word, a loyal interpreter, or again, in the process of
imitation, find yourself in a tight corner from which shame, or
the rule of craft, won’t let you move” (125). Emulation,
counterintuitively, liberates the writer. Longinus compares
reading to the transcendent, supernatural of the Pythia at
Delphi:
Similarly, the genius of the ancients acts as a
kind of oracular cavern, and effluences flow
from it into the minds of their imitators. Even
those previously not much inclined to prophesy
9 Aristotle’s

notion of verisimilitude.
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become inspired and share the enthusiasm
which comes from the greatness of others.
It is a righteous burden, to read the greats and attempt to write
as greatly: “Truly it is a noble contest and prize of honour,
and one well worth winning, in which to be defeated by one’s
elders is itself no disgrace” (142).
In one of the Phaedrus’ ultimate rejections of written
texts, Socrates declares: “They seem to talk to you as though
they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what
they say, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you
just the same thing forever” (521). Plato’s argument rests
upon the then-fundamental truth that a written work lacks the
truth-seeking, engaging dynamism of the dialectic. He had no
notion of the Greek and Latin textual tradition about to
develop, leading scholars like Longinus to pose once
unfathomable queries: “Even more stimulating is the further
thought: ‘How will posterity take what I am writing?’” (143).
To write sublimely, for Longinus, is to outlast a specific
cultural milieu; for Horace, effective poetry which pleases
and instructs is that which improves upon the most ubiquitous
of extent works. Unlike the Platonists’ absolute truths, the
learned pagans recognized a dynamic tradition influenced by
varying circumstances – not relativism exactly, but certainly
something appreciable for modernists. Learning to compose
meant, above all, reading the greats: for inspiration,
opportunity, and challenge.
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Note: This paper was originally written for Professor Rita
Copeland’s Spring 2014 section of CLST 396: Literary
Theory Ancient to Modern
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